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Specialization in high-tech products is frequently used to capture technology intensity of 
exports. The literature suggests that developing countries are increasingly becoming exporters 
of high-tech products, and some may even be among the most deeply specialized countries in 
the field of high-tech exports. The paper scrutinizes the relevance of the taxonomies that 
classify exports by technological intensity in this context. It is shown that specialization in 
high-tech exports typically does not appear in tandem with indigenous technological 
capabilities in developing countries. The analysis of intra-product imports suggests that the 
bulk of high-tech exports can actually be attributed to the effect of increasingly international 
fragmentation of production systems in electronics on trade statistics. It is confirmed in an 
econometric framework that while domestic technological capabilities have some influence 
on export performance in electronics, it is the propensity to import electronics components 
that accounts for by far the largest proportion of cross-country differences in specialization in 
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1. Introduction 
 
The possibility that specialization in technologically intensive activities matters for economic 
development is well established in the literature on technological change. It is stressed in the 
Schumpeterian literature that prospects for productivity growth differ across activities because 
of differences in technological opportunities (Schumpeter 1934, Nelson and Winter 1982, 
Verspagen 1993 and Fagerberg 2002). The Post-Keynesian perspective that specialization in 
some segments of international demand provides better growth prospects because of higher 
income elasticity can also be interpreted as reflecting differences in quality and technological 
intensity (Fagerberg 1988 and Dalum, Laursen and Verspagen 1999). 
 
It is therefore not surprising that specialization in exports of products generally perceived as 
high-tech frequently appears in comparative studies by international organizations, 
governmental bodies and other institutions (UNDP 2001, UNIDO 2002, UNCTAD 2002ab, 
NSF 2002, OECD 2003 and IMD 2005) as well as in academic research on technology, trade 
and growth (Guerrieri and Milana 1995, Fagerberg 1997, Mani 2000, Lall 2000, Kadeřábková 
and Srholec 2001 or Srholec 2006). The empirical literature confirms that high-tech products 
are the fastest growing segment of international trade. Moreover, there is strong evidence that 
developing countries are increasingly becoming exporters of high-tech products. It is 
particularly convenient to use the share of high-tech products in exports as a proxy for the 
technological intensity of local export bases in developing countries because the information 
is available for virtually every country with trade statistics, while evidence on other measures 
directly reflecting technology, such as those based on R&D or innovation surveys, still 
remains scarce. 
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Although frequently applied in the literature, we still find little discussion of the relevance of 
the various taxonomies of industries and products by technological intensity for cross-country 
comparisons. It is typically assumed that high-tech exports reflect the technological intensity 
of the local business activity, with limited attention given to the possibility that actual 
technological content may differ across countries. As some have already remarked, the direct 
link between the focus of export specialization and local technological capabilities cannot be 
taken for granted, particularly in the context of latecomer countries. Lall (2000) directly notes 
that a significant part of the high-tech industry outbreak in developing countries might be 
“something of a statistical illusion”, as they specialize in labour-intensive processes within 
high-tech-intensive industries. Similarly, Mayer, Butkevicius, and Kadri (2002) suggest that 
the expansion of high-tech exports from developing countries is largely because of their 
increased participation in labour-intensive segments of high-tech electronics in the context of 
international production sharing. Despite these reservations, however, the studies focus on the 
structure of exports without many further concerns. 
 
A further step in this vein is taken by Mani (2000), who investigated directly whether the 
surge of high-tech exports from developing countries is “real or rather a statistical artefact”. 
The paper focused on patenting activity in newly industrialized Asian countries. The main 
finding is that only two of them, namely Korea and Taiwan, had any significant number of 
patents in the high-tech fields, whereas the other major exporters of high-tech products from 
Asia had fairly limited patenting records. However, the study concludes that these countries as 
a whole were rapidly catching up, so it might be unwise to write off their performance as a 
mere statistical artefact. Srholec (2006) looks beyond the Asian countries and focuses in detail 
on the role of international production sharing for high-tech exports. This study suggests that   4
many latecomer countries experienced a rapid growth of high-tech exports, but gained little in 
terms of contribution to upgrading of local technological capabilities.  
 
This paper further re-examines the indicator of high-tech exports by means of a detailed 
quantitative analysis of the “statistical illusion” hypothesis in a large sample of countries. The 
next section briefly outlines the methodology of the industry-based taxonomies of 
technological intensity and highlights some of their main caveats, particularly in the light of 
the increasing international fragmentation of production. The empirical analysis starts with a 
cross-country comparison of specialization in high-tech exports as typically done in the 
existing literature. A simple comparison with intensity of R&D expenditure reveals, however, 
that the indicator in many cases has a little to do with indigenous technological capabilities. It 
is further shown that electronic goods in particular account for the bulk of high-tech exports 
from most countries. 
 
We therefore search for other explanatory factors of export specialization in electronics. We 
focus on a possible role of the deepening fragmentation of value chains across the globe by 
establishing a distinction between trade in final electronics products and in their components. 
The analysis reveals that specialization in exports of electronics appears in tandem with a high 
propensity to import electronics products, particularly components. The paper also proposes a 
simple synthetic indicator, which captures the essence of the argument without the necessity 
of looking at the detailed structure of national imports. The possibility that the observed 
patterns of specialization might suffer from statistical bias because of double (and multiple) 
counting of components in trade statistics is further investigated in an economic framework. It 
is shown that technological capabilities explain a certain portion of cross-country differences 
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in export specialization in electronics, but the propensity to import electronics components is 
by far a more relevant explanatory factor. The final section concludes and discusses 
implications for policy. 
 
2. The pitfalls of industry-based taxonomies of technological 
intensity 
 
A number of taxonomies classifying industries according to technology, science and skills 
intensity, sources of competitive advantage or general character of innovation processes have 
been proposed over the years (see Archibugi 2001 and Peneder 2003 for recent overviews). 
The taxonomies by the OECD and Pavitt (1984) have proved to be particularly influential in 
the literature. 
 
The OECD taxonomy classifies industries and exports solely by technological intensity. It has 
been continuously refined since the early 1980s, but perhaps its most sophisticated 
specification is given by Hatzichronoglou (1997). The sectoral approach combines three 
indicators: (1) R&D expenditure in relation to value added, (2) R&D expenditure in relation 
to production, and (3) R&D expenditure embodied in purchased intermediate and investment 
goods, which reflects technology diffusion in inputs. Accordingly, four groups of industries 
ranging from high-tech to low-tech are identified at one to four-digit levels of the UN 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC, rev. 2). The taxonomy of products 
solely defines high-tech products at three to five-digit levels of the UN Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC, rev. 3), which provides a tool for evaluating export 
specialization.
1 
                                                 
1 It should be mentioned that the product taxonomy could not be based on actual R&D intensities of individual 
products for which data is not available, so that experts have to be consulted with regard to the technology   6
 
Pavitt (1984) proposed a typology of sectoral technology trajectories, which classifies 
industries according to three major factors: (1) sources of technology, (2) nature of the 
technology produced, and (3) other characteristics of innovating firms, such as size. The 
resulting classification identifies four groups of industries that are science-based, specialized 
suppliers, supplier dominated or scale intensive.
2 Nevertheless, Pavitt and OECD are in broad 
agreement that certain segments of the economy (and therefore exports) stand out in terms of 
technological intensity. These are the science-based sector in the former and the high-tech 
segment in the latter. The empirical identifications of these high technology intensive sectors 
overlap to a large degree. As the literature has developed, different applications have used 
slightly different specifications, but it is typical that aerospace, pharmaceuticals and 
electronics are among those considered as high-tech sectors. 
 
In general terms, classification of individual agents into generic types is a process of reducing 
heterogeneity (Peneder 2003). On the one hand, some information is lost at each step 
of aggregation, but on the other hand, some analytical gains can be derived from reducing the 
vast complexity of individual data. An industry reduces a swarm of firms into an easily 
understandable narrative, while an industry-based taxonomy further reduces a number of 
industries into several salient types given their selected attributes. Indeed, the reason that 
taxonomies are so popular is that they provide even greater simplification of reality than 
standard industrial classifications, but one should always keep in mind the underlying 
heterogeneity and apply its reduction carefully.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
intensity of some product groups. A certain degree of arbitrariness is embedded in the product taxonomy in 
contrast to the sectoral approach, which is based on clear-cut quantitative measures. 
2 For a recent research related to the Pavitt’s taxonomy see Marsili (2001), Pol, Carroll and Robertson (2002) or 
Castellacci (2004).   7
As soon as a taxonomy is created, moreover, it tends to become detached from the original 
context and applied repeatedly to various areas and periods. For example, the OECD 
taxonomy was constructed on the basis of a sample of 22 industries in 10 OECD countries 
(Hatzichronoglou 1997, pg. 5), which makes it quite problematic to extrapolate attributes of 
the high-tech category to the context of developing countries, as will be seen below. It is 
typically assumed in empirical applications of the taxonomy that firms in fields labelled as 
high-tech are more innovative and employ more skilled workforces without looking at their 
actual technological competencies and business strategies in the particular location. However, 
the relative similarity within a taxonomic type and the differences among types are always 
essential. If these similarities and differences do not apply in the particular context, the 
taxonomy becomes misleading. As Peneder (2003) puts it, one generally should not use the 
taxonomic approach only for the purpose of making the analysis more convenient, if more 
specific data are available in a similar format. 
 
As already noted, similar data for technological capabilities are often not available for 
developing countries, which makes the quick-fix solution of using the industry-based 
taxonomies by technological intensity particularly attractive. One has to assume, however, 
that the similarities and differences between the taxonomic types are primarily industry 
specific irrespective of the local context. This might be a valid assumption if we compare 
countries with otherwise broadly similar characteristics, but it might be an unstable basis for 
an analysis if countries with highly different attributes are under scrutiny. The heterogeneity 
of industries across countries in particular should not be underestimated in comparisons of 
economies at greatly different levels of development. Indeed, a new electronic chip design 
requires different capabilities compared with its manufacturing, testing or even low-skilled 
assembling into a final product. Although these business activities might fall into the same 
category of industrial classification, such as electronics, we would get an essentially different   8
picture of specialization if looking at them separately. If this is the case, the categorization of 
electronics as a high-tech industry might be highly misleading in low-cost locations, and 
application of the taxonomy can hardly be justified by the non-existence of other data. 
 
All of these concerns are even more accentuated by the increasing fragmentation of value 
chains across national borders. The process of fragmentation means separation of individual 
phases of production in space, ownership or both (Arndt and Kierzkowski 2001).
3 
Fragmentation is not a new phenomenon by any means. The history of production systems 
may well be seen as a gradual process of deepening division of labour from local to national 
and global contexts, and from farms to factories, and ultimately to global production 
networks. What is unprecedented about the process, however, is the global scale and scope of 
fragmentation today. The “fragmentability” of value chains has increased substantially as a 
consequence of advances in technology, while the scope of production networks has reached 
global dimensions with liberalization of trade and investment in recent decades (and both 
have been reinforced by the increasing size of international demand). 
 
An important implication of fragmentation is that firms become increasingly specialized in 
particular segments of value chains within industries, which might make them more similar to 
firms specialized in corresponding niches of other traditionally perceived industries. 
Specialization in simple assembly of electronics products is intensive on inputs - such as 
cheap labour - much more similar to assembly of agricultural machinery and even to the 
manufacture of garments, compared with the capabilities needed for the development of the 
next generation of LCD displays. Fragments of value chains from different industries, which 
                                                 
3 Some aspects of the fragmentation process have also been described in the literature as industrial differentiation 
(Young 1928), vertical disintegration (Rosenberg 1963), integration of trade and disintegration of production 
(Feenstra 1998), vertical specialization (Hummels et al. 2001), “slicing up the value chain” (Krugman 1995) and 
simply outsourcing at the firm level (Kogut 1985).   9
share intensity on similar resources, tend to cluster in countries with relevant endowments. It 
is the particular fragment of production that clusters locally, not industries with complete 
value chains. The ultimate effect is that specialization of countries seen through the lenses of 
the traditional industry and product classifications, let alone the even more aggregated 
taxonomies, might increasingly fail to capture the underlying reality, especially in 
comparisons across locations with entirely different endowments. 
 
The flip side is that the deepening fragmentation of value chains allows labour-intensive 
activities in manufacturing of high-tech products to be carried out in countries that previously 
had not been able to participate in production of such products. In this respect, the process of 
fragmentation implies that we should observe increasing exports of high-tech products from 
the low-cost locations, where the manufacturing segments relocate, whereas the most skill-
intensive activities, such as research and development, might remain clustered in developed 
countries. The latter is not tradable - at least not in terms of merchandise trade - so we might 
even observe a decrease of high-tech exports from the countries at the technological frontier. 
If this is the case, a comparative analysis of high-tech exports may provide a picture that is 
actually the opposite of what is going on in reality. We might observe a rapid catching up of 
developing countries in terms of high-tech exports, while at the same time the actual 
technology gap may be deepening further. 
 
Still, we often tend to think about specialization in the traditional context of end products and 
complete value chains. We are accustomed to perceiving exportation of electronics from the 
United States, Costa Rica and the Philippines as it were the same phenomenon. Does it make 
sense to think about the export of computers assembled from imported components in the 
Philippines as high-tech exports? Isn’t it the actual technological intensity of business   10
activities performed locally, rather than the fact that they happen to be generally classified 
into the high-tech category, that matters for national specialization? It might well be that we 
have passed a threshold, when losses from simplifications using industry-based taxonomies 
become higher than analytical gains from them, particularly for broad cross-country 
comparisons. 
 
3. Specialization in high-tech exports: The indicator of what? 
 
It is well established in the literature that economic development requires structural change, 
so it is important to analyse structural shifts along the way. It is also rightly argued that 
moving into manufacturing exports entails greater development opportunities because of 
economies of scale and scope, export diversification and typically higher skills and 
technological intensity, compared with exports based on exploitation of natural endowments. 
Although a broad distinction between primary, resource-based and manufacturing trade is 
relatively straightforward, it is far more complicated to differentiate technological intensity of 
trade. 
 
As noted above, it is customary to capture technological intensity of exports by comparing 
specialization in products perceived as high-tech across countries. Figure 1 provides a 
comparison for a large group of countries. The share of high-tech products in merchandise 
exports is plotted on the vertical axis against the intensity of economies in R&D expenditure 
on the horizontal axis. The dotted lines show sample averages, which divide the figure into 
four quadrants with below/above average scores along the two dimensions. The data for trade 
are based on the World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset from the World Bank, which 
refers to high-tech exports as products with high R&D intensity, such as aerospace,   11
pharmaceuticals, computers, scientific instruments and electrical machinery. This is in line 
with the definition of the OECD taxonomy and is fairly close to exports of industries 
generally viewed as science-based, in Pavitt’s taxonomy. The data for R&D expenditure are 
drawn from various sources, including OECD (2005), UNESCO (2005), RICYT (2005) and 
national sources. The data should be broadly similar to definitions given by the OECD 
Frascati Manual. 
 
Figure 1: High-tech exports and R&D expenditure, average over 2001–2003 
 
 
Note: The income groups given by GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2000 USD) are as follows: high income: more 
than 15,000; medium income: between 5,000 and 15,000; low income: less than 5,000. R&D expenditure in 
Malta was estimated according to data for R&D employment. 
Source: World Bank (2005), OECD (2005), UNESCO (2005), RICYT (2005) and national sources. 
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A majority of countries maintain a below-average share of high-tech exports, which means 
that they are not specialized in exporting these products. Most low-income countries report 
negligible high-tech exports, although specialization in high-tech exports is by no means a 
privilege of the most technologically advanced countries. Striking is the fact that the country 
specializing the most in high-tech exports is the Philippines, where roughly 65% of exports 
fall into the high-tech category. Other outliers include Malta, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan 
and Ireland, where high-tech products account for more than a third of exports. A handful of 
typical examples of latecomer countries, such as Korea, China, Thailand, Costa Rica, Mexico 
and Hungary also perform quite well in the high-tech area. What does it mean? What does it 
tell us? Looking solely at the specialization in high-tech exports, one could easily conclude 
that many developing countries have been extremely successful in catching up technologically 
and have even overtaken the United States, Japan and the EU in terms of the technological 
intensity of their economies. 
 
A look at the horizontal axis reveals the lingering divide between the developed and 
developing countries in terms of indigenous technological capabilities. Specialization in high-
tech exports does not match the intensity of the economy in R&D expenditure in many areas, 
particularly in the examples of high-tech exporters from latecomer countries given above. 
Hence the fundamentals of specialization patterns of these countries are probably not based on 
sophisticated technological capabilities. The figure confirms the expectation that production 
systems in the high-tech fields became internationally fragmented to the extent that countries 
can export large amounts of high-tech products while actually mastering very limited 
technological capabilities themselves. The overall correspondence between the intensity on 
high-tech exports and R&D spending given by R
2 comes out at 0.12, suggesting that the 
indicators share only about one tenth of cross-country differences. If we omit the most   13
extreme outliers from the comparison (the Philippines, Malta, Singapore, Malaysia, Israel, 
Sweden and Iceland), however, R
2 edges up to 0.43, which confirms that the indicators are 
associated to a certain extent. Still there are other factors with much more explanatory power 
as will be seen below. 
 
The disparity is most striking in the Philippines, Malta, Malaysia, which have more than 45% 
of exports in the high-tech fields, and to a lesser extent in Costa Rica, Mexico and Thailand, 
with around 20% of high-tech exports, but their spending on R&D is well below 1% of GDP. 
In general, the East Asian region clearly emerges as an important cluster for the 
manufacturing of high-tech products, but there seems to be a fairly strong divide in 
localization of related technological capabilities in the “first tier” of the newly industrialized 
countries and the rest of the region. A group of high-income Asian countries, namely 
Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and Japan, is among the top 15 countries in both specialization in 
high-tech exports and R&D intensity, while the others fall well behind in technological 
capabilities. As a consequence of its sheer size and unique development trajectory, China is 
arguably a special case in this context. In terms of R&D intensity, China has already 
overtaken some of the high-income countries such as Ireland and some southern European 
countries. Regional differences between gravitational centres of business activity and other 
mainly rural areas suggest that some Chinese regions probably maintain an R&D intensity 
substantially above the national average and even closer to that of other developed countries.
4 
 
As suggested, the phenomenon behind the contrast between specialization in high-tech 
exports and indigenous R&D capabilities is the increasing fragmentation of value chains, 
                                                 
4 According to the OECD (2005), R&D expenditure in terms of GDP is reported at 1.2% in China in 2002, which 
should be based on methodology comparable with other OECD countries. The R&D intensity is estimated to 
range from 0.60% to 0.83% over the 1990s, but OECD notes that these earlier figures are based on 
underestimated data.   14
particularly the separation of technological development from related manufacturing activities 
in this context. The available empirical evidence seems to confirm the fact that 
technologically intensive activities are sticky and remain localized in the home countries of 
large multinational corporations (Patel and Pavitt 1991, Pavitt and Patel 1999, Verspagen and 
Schoenmakers 2003). Foreign direct investment in R&D is increasing worldwide, but it is 
highly concentrated among developed countries (Le Bas and Sierra 2002). It is therefore not 
surprising that R&D intensity remains rather low in developing countries despite the surge in 
high-tech exports, as they attract mainly manufacturing-based fragments of global production 
systems, while the technology-intensive fragments remain concentrated elsewhere. 
 
Srholec (2006) looks directly at R&D intensity of the high-tech sectors. It is confirmed that 
some OECD members with a relatively low income compared with the frontier countries, 
such as Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, maintain vastly lower 
R&D intensity in high-tech electronics compared with the OECD threshold that draws a cut-
off point between high-tech and the rest of manufacturing (around 20% of R&D in relation to 
value added according to OECD 2003, p. 156). It makes it truly problematic to use any high-
tech labels in the context of these countries. A look at the aggregate data suggests that it is 
plausible that the relevant industries also remain well below the OECD threshold in most of 
the other prominent high-tech exporters, which are well behind the technology frontier.  
 
Despite their limited development of local technological capabilities, some might argue that 
high-tech industries can still contribute to development because of greater potential for 
spillover effects in the economy. Relatively little is known, however, about the geographical 
reach of knowledge spillovers. As the literature suggests, spillovers are often rather local 
because knowledge is sticky in nature, with a good part of it being tacit. One needs   15
appropriate absorptive capacity to benefit from spillovers, because technology is not only 
costly to produce, but also costly to transfer; and of course, the more sophisticated technology 
becomes, the more difficult it is to transfer it in space. Therefore, as R&D spillovers are 
bounded in space - by national or other relevant borders - what ultimately matters is the actual 
R&D intensity of activities undertaken locally rather than the technological intensity of an 
industry in general. 
 
A closer look at the trade in high-tech products reveals that it is largely concentrated in a 
limited range of product groups. Figure 2 compares specialization in high-tech exports and in 
electronics. Data for the latter have been obtained from the United Nations (2005) and cover 
trade in the following products: office, accounting and computing machinery (75); radio, 
television and communications equipment (76), electrical machinery (77) and medical, 
precision and optical instruments (87, 881, 884 and 885) - all codes according to SITC, rev. 3. 
It is apparent that electronics accounts for the bulk of high-tech exports in most countries. 
Therefore, in the following sections, we focus narrowly on the analysis of trade in electronics 
as a broad representation of high-tech exports.
 5 
 
                                                 
5 Given the same scale on both axes, the figure actually suggests that the share of electronics is in many cases 
higher than the share of high-tech products reported in the WDI database, with the most extreme example being 
Hong Kong. It is not entirely clear which electronics products have not been included in the high-tech category 
in the WDI database, nor it is obvious from a closer inspection of the data for Hong Kong which particular 
products cause the difference. Srholec (2006) strictly follows the very detailed product-based OECD taxonomy 
of exports defined by Hatzichronoglou (1997), which shows that electronics had a joint share of nearly 80% in 
total world trade in high-tech products in 2000. The study also confirmed that the vast majority of high-tech 
exports from developing countries was concentrated in electronics.   16
Figure 2: Domination of high-tech exports by electronics in 2003 
 
 
Note: The income groups given by GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2000 USD) are as follows: high income: more 
than 15,000; medium income: between 5,000 and 15,000; low income: less than 5,000. 
Source: World Bank (2005) and United Nations (2005). 
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4. The effect of fragmentation on trade in electronics 
 
How could a developing country turn out to be a top exporter of electronics despite having 
very limited technological capabilities? Could it be one of the peculiar outcomes of high 
openness to trade, foreign direct investment and globalization in general? In order to throw 
some new light upon these questions, we look more closely at the role of the deepening 
fragmentation by examining intra-product trade in electronics. The dispersion of the various 
fragments of production systems mirrors in flows of inputs (production factors and 
intermediate inputs such as parts and components) between countries, which makes it possible 
to trace fragmentation in trade statistics. 
 
Following Kaminski and Ng (2001), Yeats (2001) and Lall et al. (2004), we establish a 
distinction between trade in final electronics products and trade in their components. Instead 
of using their rather arbitrary classification of products into these two groups, however, we 
use the Broad Economic Categories (BEC, rev. 3) classification officially defined by the 
United Nations, which separates trade in final products from intermediate inputs for the 
purpose of national accounts.
6 Given the availability of relevant data, the analysis provides 
evidence for a sample of 111 countries in 2003 (see Appendix 1 for overview of the sample). 
The data are based on the UN Comtrade database (United Nations 2005) with the only 
exception being Taiwan, for which fully comparable data are available from the OECD 
International Trade by Commodity Statistics. 
 
                                                 
6 The classification used by Kaminski and Ng (2001),  Yeats (2001) and Lall et al. (2004) is based on SITC (rev. 
2) for selected products. The BEC classification separates trade in final products from components for most 
manufacturing products at a very detailed (4–5 digit) level of SITC (rev. 3) and (6-digit) level of HS (1996 or 
2002) classifications. The definition based on SITC (rev. 3) is used in this paper.   18
It is essential to realize that trade statistics do not measure domestic value added embodied in 
national exports, but only gross value (sales or turnover) from exports, which creates a direct 
link between the exports and imports of a country (Krugman, 1995). The basic idea is that 
electronics components - as intermediate inputs - can be imported for the assembly of final 
products to serve domestic and foreign markets or for processing in the country to be re-
exported, still as components (such as inward–outward processing trade). If a country imports 
components, their full value might be also fully mirrored in export “sales” of the country 
irrespective of (a possibly low) value actually having been added in the country. This has two 
direct consequences: (i) the value of world trade is inflated by components repeatedly 
crossing national borders, of which the full value is counted multiple times in trade along the 
route, and (ii) a direct link between the value (and structure) of national imports and exports is 
created with countries involved in the intra-product trade appearing to be specialized in 
certain products even if value added domestically to the exports is fairly low. As the degree of 
fragmentation and hence the inflation of trade statistics is unevenly distributed across 
industries and countries, this effect biases the structure of world trade and comparisons of 
national specialization. 
 
Figure 3 provides first indications of the possible impact of fragmentation by plotting the 
share of electronics in exports against the share of the same products in imports, both 
expressed in terms of total trade (sum of exports and imports) in order to display the 
indicators on the same scale. It comes out that high specialization in electronics exports goes 
firmly in tandem with an enormous propensity to import products in the same category. The 
link is particularly strong for the group of top electronics exporters displayed in the upper part 
of the figure. Given the same units and scales on both axes, we can also directly observe the 
trade balance in electronics, which is given by the dotted line. Countries in the upper left   19
segment of the figure have a trade surplus, while countries in the lower right area maintain a 
trade deficit. The figure reveals that despite the high import propensity, none of the countries 
that are highly specialized in electronics suffers from a trade deficit in these products, 
although the trade is essentially balanced in some, such as Hong Kong, China and the 
Netherlands. Of course, the surplus is certainly a positive outcome for the top electronics 
exporters; yet one would probably expect much higher surpluses in many of them given the 
importance of electronics in their export specializations. Unfortunately, we cannot conclude 
much from the size of the surplus regarding the amount of domestic value added per 
employee to the exports, which would indicate the underlying technological intensity of the 
local export base. 
 
Figure 4 reveals the relative importance of final electronics products and their components in 
imports. A large share of components in imports suggests high involvement of a country in 
global production systems and indicates possible bias in export specialization if the imported 
components tend to be mirrored in value of exports again. The difference along these two 
lines among countries specializing in exports of electronics on the one hand, and East Asia 
compared with the rest of the world on the other hand, clearly confirms that the divide matters 
at least from an analytical point of view. The share of final electronics products appears in a 
relatively narrow range in most countries, with a maximum of only 16.3% in Hong Kong, 
while the share of electronics components accounts for more than 18% in 12 other countries 
and edges up to 35.0% in Singapore, 44.9% in Malaysia and 47.3% in the Philippines. Most 
of the latter are economies well below the technological frontier and/or from countries East 
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Figure 3: Exports and imports of electronics in 2003 
 
 
Note: The income groups given by GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2000 USD) are as follows: high income: more 
than 15,000; medium income: between 5,000 and 15,000; low income: less than 5,000. 
Source: Own computations based on the United Nations (2005). 
 
 
Asia. On the other hand, the United States, Japan and all of the EU members (except Ireland, 
Malta and Hungary) maintain a share of electronics components not very different from the 
average, which makes it approximately equal to the share of final electronics products in these 
countries. It is not surprising to see predominantly lower income countries with high imports 
of electronics components because processing of components or their assembly into final 
products is obviously intensive on endowments other than technological capabilities. The 
main exceptions are Singapore, Taiwan and Korea with high components imports as well as 
relatively developed technological capabilities, which probably points to their rather special 
role as hubs in the East Asian production networks.   21
Figure 4: Imports of components and final products in 2003 
 
 
Note: RCA is the index of revealed comparative advantage — see chapter 4 for formal definition. 
Source: Own computations based on the United Nations (2005). 
 
 
Footprints of production networks orchestrated by the leading multinational corporations in 
electronics can be traced in the trade of many countries.
7 It is this segment of trade where 
intra-product trade within value chains of products widely overlaps with intra-firm trade 
between subsidiaries under the ownership umbrella of a single multinational corporation. 
Localization of manufacturing plants of the multinational corporations leaves strong patterns 
in trade of latecomer countries. For example, General Electric maintains manufacturing 
                                                 
7 The global governance of value chains by multinational corporations has been thoroughly examined in the 
business literature (see Kogut 1985, Ernst and Kim 2002 or Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005 and other 
references therein).   22
facilities in approximately 40 countries; the leading chipmaker, Intel, has large manufacturing 
plants in the Philippines, Malaysia, China, Ireland, Israel, Costa Rica and Mexico; the 
footprints of IBM can be found in Singapore, China, Thailand, Mexico, Ireland and Hungary; 
Siemens maintains major investment projects in China, India, Brazil and the Czech Republic; 
while the European semiconductor manufacturer ST Microelectronics dominates the 
electronics trade of the small Maltese economy. A similar pattern appears in the global spread 
of production networks of electronics contractual manufacturers such as Solectron, 
Flextronics or Celestica (Lüethje 2001). It is probably localization of these factories that 
accounts for a substantial part of both the electronics exports and imports of many developing 
countries. 
 
It is evident from the analysis that the distinctive feature of countries with a generally high 
share of electronics in imports (and consequently in exports) is a particularly high propensity 
to import electronics components. Perhaps nothing could be more telling than the fact that 
specialization in electronics exports is highly correlated to imports of electronics components 
(R
2 = 0.85), whereas there seems to be no relation between electronics exports and imports of 
final electronics products (R
2 = 0.04) when expressed in terms of total trade. In other words, 
the findings suggest that cross-country variance in propensity to import electronics is driven 
by imports of components.   23
5. The factors behind high-tech exports: regression analysis 
 
The descriptive analysis has suggested that specialization in high-tech exports appears in 
tandem with technological capabilities in countries close to the technological frontier, but 
there is also a group of mostly latecomer countries with high performance in high-tech 
exports, particularly in electronics, that is largely based on other than technological 
comparative advantages. A distinctive feature of the latter group is their high propensity to 
import electronics components, which reflects their alignment with global production 
networks, but also raises some doubts regarding the actual basis for their performance in 
electronics exports.  
 
A natural next step is to examine the relative relevance of the factors outlined above in an 
econometric framework. The dependent variable is specialization in electronics exports, 
which is regressed against the level of indigenous technological capabilities and indicators 
reflecting the propensity to import electronics. Following the analysis of intra-product trade, 
we distinguish between imports of electronics final products and electronics components. All 
of the trade-based indicators are expressed in terms of total trade (sum of exports and imports) 
to maintain them on the same scale. The aim of the regression analysis is to assess relative 
explanatory power of technology capabilities as compared to the propensity to intra-product 
imports for explaining specialization in exports of electronics. 
 
Data on R&D expenditure are available only for 83 countries in the sample. In order to refrain 
from estimating the key explanatory variable for a relatively large number of countries, we 
construct alternative measure of technological capabilities based on indicators with broader 
cross-country coverage: number of ICT patents at the USPTO per capita, number of personal   24
computers per capita and gross tertiary enrolment. Some limited data for the latter two 
indicators remained to be estimated.
8 The choice of the indicators is aimed at accounting for 
factors related directly to technological capabilities in electronics, which are represented by 
the patenting records in the relevant areas and the diffusion of computers in the economy, as 
well as for some aspect of skills endowment represented by higher education. Since the 
variables are highly correlated, we have used factor analysis to construct a single composite 
indicator of technological capabilities.
9 A brief look at the correlation table given in Appendix 
2 reveals that the composite is also highly correlated to intensity of R&D expenditure (in the 
limited sample for which the R&D data are available), which confirms its relevance in this 
context. 
 
Some caveats in the measures of intra-product imports should be acknowledged at this point. 
We do not really know whether the imported components are directed into export-oriented 
production or manufactured into products for a domestic market. If the latter is the case, no 
loop between imports and exports occurs, with obviously no influence on exports 
specialization. For example, China specializes in exports of electronics and imports large 
amounts of electronics components, but also has a large and expanding domestic market, 
where some of the products manufactured from the imported components are marketed. The 
regression analysis allows us to address at least partly the caveat by controlling for the size of 
the domestic market through inclusion of population (in logs) in the estimate. It might also 
                                                 
8 The indicators are used in the form of three-year averages over the period 2001–2003 in order to increase 
coverage across countries and to limit the influence of fluctuations occurring in specific years. We used the 
regression-based impute procedure in Stata 9 to fill the missing values for personal computers in five countries 
and for tertiary enrolment in four countries (the imputation was based on the other technology variables). The 
data for personal computers and gross enrolments in tertiary education have been drawn from the World Bank 
(2005) and the data for ICT patents from OECD Patent Database - for definition of the ICT-related patents, see 
OECD (2003, p. 26). The number of ICT patents for the United States has been adjusted following the approach 
by Archibugi and Coco (2004, p. 633) to account for a possible home base advantage.  
9 The factor analysis (principal-component method) identified only a single factor with eigenvalue above unity 
(eigenvalue = 2.21, 73.6% of variability explained) with the following factor loadings of the variables: ICT 
patents per capita = 0.82, computers per capita = 0.93 and gross tertiary enrolment = 0.83.   25
have been relevant to include differences in purchasing power of the domestic market (GDP 
per capita in PPP),  but this is already picked up by the composite of technological capabilities 
because these indicators are highly correlated to (R
2 = 0.75). 
 
Table 1 gives the regression results. The first column provides results of an ordinary least 
square estimate. All of the variables come out as significant explanatory factors. It is 
confirmed that technological capabilities matter for specialization in electronics exports, 
although the propensity to import electronics components explains even more. The magnitude 
of the coefficient for the latter is roughly three times greater than that for the technological 
capabilities, which highlights the fact that the bulk of cross-country differences in electronics 
exports should rather be attributed to intra-product imports.
10 The overall explanatory power 
is very high - the estimate explains around 92% of cross-country differences in specialization 
in electronics exports. 
 
The effect of the other two explanatory variables seems to be relatively marginal, but the 
significantly negative sign of the propensity to import final electronics products deserves 
some explanation. It is put forward in the so-called “new trade theories” that countries 
simultaneously export and import products from the same industries because of product 
 
                                                 
10 All of the variables have been standardized (deducting mean and dividing by standard deviation) before 
running the regressions, which essentially implies that beta coefficients of the estimated parameters are reported. 
Since the variables are on the same scale, the beta coefficients allow for a direct comparison of the coefficient’s 
magnitude across variables. Another effect of the standardization is that sample average is equal to zero, which 
implies that by definition, the constant term equals zero as well (except the robust least squares estimate, where 
the observations are given different weights). All other reported regression statistics remain intact.   26
Table 1: Regression results 






Constant ..  –0.001  .. 
 ..  (0.04)  .. 
Size (population in logs)  0.08**  0.06**  0.07** 
  (2.32) (2.50) (2.24) 
Technological  capabilities  0.29*** 0.29*** 0.25*** 
 (7.96)  (11.64)  (3.92) 
Imports of components  0.87***  0.89***  0.93*** 
 (20.26)  (38.21)  (7.29) 
Imports of final products  –0.08***  –0.08***  –0.15*** 
  (2.71) (3.15) (2.74) 
F 172.37  481.26  88.63 
R2 0.92  ..  0.91 
Number of observations  111  111  111 
 
Note: The dependent variable is exports of electronics - all of the trade-based indicators are expressed in terms of 
total trade (sum of exports and imports) of a country in order to adjust for size differences and to retain them on 
the same scale. The absolute value of robust t-statistics is given in parentheses; *, **, *** denote significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. An overview of instruments for the two-stage least squares estimate 
is given in Appendix 3. Standardized variables are used in the estimates (beta values reported, which implies that 
the coefficient’s magnitude is directly comparable across variables, and the constant term is equal to zero by 
definition).  
 
differentiation (Helpman and Krugman 1985, Krugman 1995, Lee and Lloyd 2002), which 
has been dubbed intra-industry trade. However, as emphasized by Arndt and Kierzkowski 
(2001), even though the literature on intra-industry trade should naturally examine trade in 
components, it tends to focus mostly on trade in varieties of final products.
 11  Our analysis 
clearly reveals that it is the import of components in particular that goes in tandem with 
exports of products from the same industry, at least as far as electronics is concerned. In fact, 
imports of final products are even negatively associated with exports of the same products. 
 
                                                 
11 It should be mentioned that there is some overlap between the concepts of intra-industry and intra-product 
trade (and also intra-firm trade as already noted above). If vertical and horizontal differentiation of trade within 
an industry is distinguished, the former can be dubbed vertical intra-industry and the latter horizontal intra-
industry trade (Greenaway, Hine and Milner 1995). The vertically differentiated intra-industry exchange 
overlaps with intra-product trade between firms in the same industry, although the latter concept covers much 
broader phenomenon - components originating from a certain industry can be used as intermediate inputs into 
wide range of other industries, which is particularly the case for generic components. From this perspective, the 
regression analysis particularly takes into account the vertical intra-industry segment of the broader intra-product 
trade in electronics. For more detailed discussion along these lines, including formal modeling, see for example 
Feenstra (1998), Jones (2000) and Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001).   27
The regression results can be influenced by the presence of outliers in the sample. To check 
for possible bias, we performed robust regression - iteratively reweighted least squares - 
which assigns a certain weight to each observation, with lower weights given to outliers. Not 
much change occurred in the robust estimate. The magnitude of coefficients turns out to be 
very similar, while the significance of the explanatory variables and the model improved. 
Hence, the results do not seem to be driven by outliers. 
 
Moreover, reverse causality from the specialization in electronics exports to the technological 
capabilities as well as patterns of imports cannot be excluded, so we account for impact of the 
potentially endogeneity of these variables by performing a two-stage least squares estimate. 
The composite of technological capabilities and the propensity to import components and 
final products were instrumented by a battery of exogenous factors given by history, 
geography and culture, which proved to be valid instruments (not correlated to residuals of the 
first stage regression - see Appendix 3 for an overview of the instruments). The results are 
reassuring. The main difference is in the coefficient for imports of final products, for which 
the magnitude doubled, while the estimated coefficients for the other variables are not 
affected.
 12 It is further confirmation of a rather substitution relation between imports of final 
products and exports in the same industry, while the opposite seems to be the case for import 
of components.
 If a country has a productive capacity in electronics, part of it goes to exports 
and some of it substitutes for imports of final products  
 
                                                 
12 A Durbin–Wu–Hausman test of endogeneity confirms that the propensity to import final products appears to 
be endogenous at the 15% level (the other suspected variables do not seem to be endogenous at the 20% level). 
The test is performed by first regressing each potentially endogenous explanatory variable on all exogenous 
variables, including instruments, and then adding residuals from these regressions in the second regression. If 
some of the residuals come out as significant in the second regression, the endogeneity of the variable is 
detected. For further details see Wooldridge (2002, pp 118–122).   28
Conclusions 
 
Although the theoretical argument about the role of specialization in technologically intensive 
activities for development is perhaps more relevant than ever in the context of the 
“globalizing learning economy”, we should use taxonomies to gauge empirically the 
technological intensity of exports with caution. Our analysis suggests that the share of high-
tech products in exports is not necessarily associated with indigenous technological 
capabilities. We show that high specialization of certain - particularly developing - countries 
in electronics exports is to a large extent a reflection of the rapid dispersion of global 
production networks across national borders, which inflates trade statistics with these 
products. It is right to issue a warning for those tempted to apply the industry-based 
taxonomies in broad cross-country comparative studies, particularly for comparing countries 
at largely different levels of development. 
 
Mani (2000) has already pointed to a possible difference between specialization in exports of 
electronics parts and exports of final products. But looking solely at the structure of exports, 
Mani finds little support for the “statistical illusion” hypothesis regarding high-tech exports 
from developing countries. Being aware of the possible effect of fragmentation on export 
specialization, Lall et al. (2004) also seek to refine the taxonomic approach by using the 
distinction between finished products and their components. However, they found it difficult 
to capture the fragmentation effect in electronics and automotive industries empirically. The 
main contribution of this paper is to show that the distinction between trade in final products 
and their components truly matters for cross-country differences in electronics exports. It 
comes out that the key to capturing the effects of fragmentation is to take into account the 
structure of the import side, rather than to refine the taxonomies by deeper analyses of 
exports.   29
 
Our findings suggest that developing countries typically attract manufacturing-based 
fragments of global production networks in electronics, while technology-intensive activities 
remain concentrated elsewhere. Even if a country exports large amounts of high-tech 
products, it can remain specialized in low-tech and low-skill fragments of the particular value 
chain while actually mastering very limited technological capabilities. The fundamentals of 
the specialization patterns of these countries, in terms of actual technological intensity of 
production fragments localized in the country, might not have changed so much. Contrary to 
some popular beliefs, it comes out that upgrading of indigenous technological capabilities is a 
more complex process than a first look at the outstanding performance of some latecomer 
countries in high-tech exports might suggest. 
 
Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom in the literature, and particularly among policy 
makers, is that increasing specialization in high-tech exports is highly desirable for 
development. A typical industrial policy is focused on providing incentives to attract 
investment into selected segments of the economy identified primarily in terms of industries, 
such as into high-tech sectors. It is often taken for granted that a complete value chain of the 
industry will be localized in the country, without sufficiently considering the actual content of 
activities that the investor is going to develop locally. What matters for technological catching 
up in the world of fragmented production systems, however, is not whether the investor 
happens to fall into certain bracket in terms of the standard industrial classification, but 
whether the project is truly going to create high skill-intensive jobs in a particular location. 
Industrial policies should be directly targeted at specific business activities of “strategic” 
importance for technological catching rather than on specific industries and orchestrated with 
innovation and education policies to capitalize fully on the potential for catching up.   30
 
A major limitation of the study is the cross-sectional nature of the analysis, which prevents us 
from capturing dynamic effects related to increasing alignment of countries to the global 
production networks. As suggested in the literature, participation in electronics production 
networks requires learning and should be accompanied by technological upgrading in 
developing countries (Ernst 2001, Ernst and Kim 2002, Hobday 2003). It is important to 
realize, on the other hand, that the deeper fragmentation – increasing division of labour – 
implies deeper specialization of firms as well as regions and countries in particular niches of 
the fragmented value chains, which makes a lock-in situation in such fragments more likely. 
A country with initially underdeveloped technological capabilities might in fact risk a further 
reinforcing of its comparative advantage at the low-cost edge of globalized value chains. It is 
an important challenge for future research to illuminate the dynamic effects accompanied to 
increasing fragmentation on economic development. 
 
It should be further noted that there are some pitfalls in the intra-product trade indicators as 
well. As already noted above, the trade data do not allow us to determine whether the 
imported components are going to be used in export or domestic-oriented production, and we 
do not really know whether a particular component is going to be directed into the same or 
other industries. Hence, the results indicate the upper boundary of statistical bias because of 
fragmentation and should therefore be interpreted with caution. A high priority in future 
research should be given to finding better indicators that can further improve our 
understanding of the effects of fragmentation on trade and other statistics. 
 
The effect of fragmentation is fairly obvious in electronics, but more research is needed to 
find out the extent to which other industries are also affected. It might well be that the paper   31
points to a general problem in comparative analyses based on standard industrial and trade 
statistics, at least as far as manufacturing is concerned. Our results suggest that it is generally 
preferable to use direct evidence from firm-level (or even establishment-level) data in 
economic analyses instead of aggregated data by industry if relevant micro datasets are 
available for research purposes (see chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis). In particular, the 
empirical identification of various theoretical typologies should be context specific using their 
actually observed attributes in the particular country in question rather than applying the 
general industry-based taxonomies based on data from elsewhere. 
 
Although the industry-identified taxonomies appear to be problematic for use in broad cross-
country comparative analyses, they still do not lack merit in empirical research, even in the 
context of developing countries. It may actually be welcome that an industry-based taxonomy 
reflects certain attributes of industries irrespective of the local context. The general attributes 
of the taxonomic types provide variables exogenous to the particular location, which can be 
used to control for purely industry-specific factors (for example, see chapter 5 of this thesis). 
The contrast between the technological intensity of an industry worldwide and that in a 
particular location might also be interpreted as a potential for technological catching up - an 
opportunity for development driven by the high-tech industries realized elsewhere, which fails 
to be fully exploited in the particular latecomer country.   32
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Philippines  34.28  24.67 2.26 Spain  3.83 2.83 4.63
Malaysia  30.83  19.74 3.61 Turkey  3.64 2.98 3.51
Singapore  29.81  16.46 5.88 Belarus  3.50 2.09 1.98
Malta  24.92  17.90 2.96 Canada  3.40 3.21 4.35
Hong  Kong  22.93  14.75 8.21 Croatia  3.34 2.80 6.65
Taiwan  22.78 9.26 6.09 Brazil  2.85 4.57 2.80
Korea  20.40 8.98 4.36 New  Zealand  2.76 2.51 5.68
China  18.87  11.68 5.64 Bulgaria  2.70 2.94 3.94
Ireland  18.74 6.95 4.64 Norway  2.42 2.21 3.76
Hungary  18.38 9.81 6.03 Australia  2.13 3.26 7.38
Costa  Rica  17.94  11.68 5.93 Mauritius  2.12 1.71 4.09
Japan  17.35 4.96 4.92 Jordan  2.04 2.24 3.55
Mexico  17.22 9.64 5.22 Armenia  2.00 2.13 3.47
Thailand  17.01 9.39 4.42 Latvia  1.77 2.88 5.19
Finland  14.28 4.70 4.67 Namibia  1.68 2.34 3.71
Netherlands  13.46 5.40 7.73 India  1.67 2.61 3.82
Israel  10.36 3.60 5.48 South  Africa  1.57 2.98 5.80
Czech  Republic  10.26 6.23 5.02 Greece  1.54 2.53 5.44
Switzerland  9.73 2.52 4.74 Kyrgyzstan  1.49 1.01 2.86
Sweden  9.21 3.52 4.93 Barbados  1.44 3.62 8.98
United States  9.14  4.96 8.51 Sri Lanka  1.35  1.66  2.67
Germany  9.04 3.78 4.30 Macedonia,  FYR  1.30 1.49 4.61
Estonia  8.41 5.91 5.93 Russia  0.90 1.97 4.72
Indonesia  8.39 0.96 1.43 Lebanon  0.78 1.75 5.03
United  Kingdom  8.23 3.88 6.67 Oman  0.77 2.09 1.34
Slovenia  7.60 3.17 3.09 Moldova  0.72 1.66 3.16
France  6.72 3.27 4.61 Colombia  0.69 1.54 6.69
Denmark  6.53 3.03 5.21 Argentina  0.68 1.60 2.61
Austria  6.23 3.35 4.33 Guatemala  0.67 1.86 5.80
Portugal  6.04 4.51 4.31 El  Salvador  0.64 2.18 5.41
Tunisia  6.02 4.90 3.28 Pakistan  0.61 1.18 2.76
Slovakia  5.50 4.57 3.36 Rwanda  0.57 3.65 7.49
Morocco  5.43 3.52 3.74 Cyprus  0.53 2.68 6.84
Poland  5.34 3.64 4.14 Bolivia  0.48 1.28 2.76
Italy  5.06 2.44 3.82 Cote  d'Ivoire  0.40 0.72 1.30
Romania  4.43 4.46 4.51 Senegal  0.38 1.68 2.49
Belgium  4.26 1.73 3.09 Venezuela  0.38 1.05 2.21
Lithuania  4.05 2.69 3.74 Kenya  0.37 1.16 3.07
Continue on the next page  37

































































































































































































Madagascar  0.36 1.83 3.52 Malawi  0.10 1.53 3.26
Iceland  0.35 3.30 5.12 Niger  0.09 1.16 4.92
Albania  0.31 3.55 4.03 Nepal  0.09 2.54 3.33
Trinidad and Tobago  0.31 0.95 2.19 Uganda  0.08 2.01 8.49
Uruguay  0.30 1.69 2.41 Fiji  0.08 2.23 3.82
Kazakhstan  0.28 1.83 2.78 Guyana  0.07 1.38 1.52
Honduras 0.25  2.29 5.48 Central African Rep.  0.07 1.14 1.82
Chile  0.24 1.63 4.31 Nicaragua  0.07 2.33 7.41
Georgia  0.20 2.04 3.97 Egypt  0.07 2.70 2.61
Cameroon  0.20 1.18 2.42 Azerbaijan  0.06 2.16 2.75
Peru  0.19 1.49 5.11 Togo  0.04 0.87 1.21
Iran  0.16 1.96 2.67 Bangladesh  0.04 0.96 1.96
Ecuador  0.16 1.91 6.52 Panama  0.02 2.68 7.96
Tanzania  0.15 2.14 3.57 Mongolia  0.02 2.36 2.70
Bahrain  0.14 1.59 1.52 Nigeria  0.02 1.31 2.15
Gabon  0.14 1.10 1.63 Algeria  0.01 1.85 2.92
Belize  0.13 2.16 4.16 Ethiopia  0.00 3.11 7.10
Syria 0.11  1.38 2.04      
   38













































































































































































































































































High-tech exports  1  0.92 0.79 0.90 0.77  0.13 0.84 0.49 0.39 0.15
Electronics exports    1  0.89 0.96 0.86  0.20 0.92 0.46 0.33 0.15
Exports of final electronics products      1  0.71 0.71  0.27 0.71 0.56 0.45 0.22
Exports of  electronics components        1  0.86  0.14 0.95 0.34 0.21 0.09
Electronics imports          1  0.55 0.93 0.33 0.18 0.07
Imports of final electronics products            1  0.21 0.36 0.26 -0.01






























            1  0.23 0.10 0.09
Technology capabilities  index                1  0.87 0.01
R&D expenditure  % of GDP                  1  0.03
Log of population  logs                    1 
Number of observations  111 111 111 111 111  111 111 111 83 111
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Appendix 3: Instrumental variables for the two-stage least squares estimate 
Instruments: Sources: 
Longitude and latitude of country centroid (in degrees)  Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) 
- CID Geography Datasets 
Malaria Ecology - ecologically-based spatial index of the 
stability of malaria transmission based on the interaction of 
climate with the dominant properties of anapheline vectors 
of malaria that determine vectorial capacity (index from 0 
to 100) 
Kiszewski, et al. (2004) 
Ethnic fractionalization - the probability that two randomly 
selected people from a given country will not belong to the same 
ethnic group (index from 0 to 1) 
Alesina, et al. (2003) 
Religious fractionalization - the probability that two 
randomly selected people from a given country will not 
belong to the same religious group (index from 0 to 1) 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
% of urban population  World Bank (2005) 
% of the population within 100 km of the ocean or ocean-
navigable river, excluding coastline above the winter extent 
of sea ice and the rivers that flow to this coastline. 
Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) 
- CID Geography Datasets 
The timing of national independence - 0 if before 1914; 1 if 
between 1914 and 1945; 2 if between 1946 and 1989; and 3 if 
after 1989 
Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) 
- CID Geography Datasets 
 
 